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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court denied Shelaina Danyell Neimeyer's motion to suppress the drug and
drug paraphernalia evidence derived from the search of a small black container in her vehicle,
determining she consented to the search.

The district court determined the totality of the

circumstances showed Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to officers searching the container, in
light of the officers implying they had probable cause to arrest and search her pursuant to a city
ordinance she violated. But the State never proved the existence of the city ordinance.
On appeal, Ms. Neimeyer asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress. The district court's legal determination that she violated the city ordinance was in
error, because the court's factual findings on the content of the city ordinance were clearly
erroneous due to the State's failure to prove its existence. The district court's factual finding that
Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to the search of the container was clearly erroneous,
because the officers implied they had probable cause to arrest and search her, even though the
city ordinance provided no legal basis to do so, which helped render her consent involuntary.
Further, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not save the evidence from exclusion.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the district court's findings of fact in its Memorandum Decision upon
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, around 2:00 a.m., Officers Thompson and Comeau went to a
gas station in Twin Falls for a welfare check. (See R., p.56.) A gas station employee had
reported to the police that a vehicle had been parked in the gas station's parking lot for over an
hour. (R., p.56.) The female occupant of the vehicle had purchased alcohol in the gas station,
and had not moved from the vehicle for over half an hour. (See R., p.56.)

1

When the officers arrived at the gas station, they did not have their police vehicles’
emergency lights on, and they parked several dozen feet behind the vehicle. (See R., pp.56-57.)
The officers approached the vehicle with their flashlights on, but did not draw their weapons.
(R., p.57.) Officer Thompson was on the driver’s side of the vehicle, and Officer Comeau was
on the passenger’s side. (See R., p.57.)
Officer Thompson saw that the vehicle’s lights were on and the key was in the ignition.
(R., p.57.) He asked the sole occupant of the vehicle, Ms. Neimeyer, for identification. (See
R., pp.56-57.) The officer asked her why she had been in the parking lot for so long, and
Ms. Neimeyer explained she had purchased items for a friend at the gas station, and had not left
yet because she had been on the phone. (R., p.57.) When Officer Thompson asked if she had
been drinking, she responded she had not been. (R., p.57.) There was an alcoholic beverage can
in the center console cup holder, but Ms. Neimeyer explained the can was empty and being used
as an ashtray. (R., p.57.) Officer Thompson then asked Ms. Neimeyer about her plans and if
there was anything the officers could do for her. (R., p.57.) She replied that she was going to go
home, there was nothing the officers could do for her, and she wanted to throw away the can
being used as an ashtray. (R., p.57.)
Officer Comeau then stated, “there’s some Fireball right there,” referencing a bottle of
alcohol located in the passenger area of the vehicle. (R., p.57.) The bottle was unsealed and
partially full. (R., p.57.) Ms. Neimeyer grabbed the bottle, moved it to the back, and stated she
could now travel with the bottle stored on the back seat. (R., p.57.) Officer Thompson indicated
she was correct in stating the bottle could be transported closed in the back seat. (R., p.57.)
Officer Comeau then asked about the small black container located on the passenger seat.
(R., p.57.) Ms. Neimeyer stated the container was empty and had contained “film and stuff . . .
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from years and years ago.” (R., p.57.) Officer Comeau asked if Ms. Neimeyer could show the
contents of the container to Officer Thompson. (R., p.57.) Per the district court’s findings of
fact, Ms. Neimeyer “protested by stating, ‘Do I really got to? I mean, I haven’t done anything
wrong.’” (R., p.57.) The court found that Officer Thompson responded, “Well, we have alcohol
in the vehicle now . . . .” (R., p.57.) Ms. Neimeyer offered to “do a test,” which the district court
interpreted as meaning a sobriety test. (R., p.57.) Officer Thompson then stated: “That’s fine.
What’s inside of the . . . .” (R., p.57.) The court found that at that point, Ms. Neimeyer “opened
the container and showed the contents to Officer Thompson.” (R., p.57.)
Officer Thompson immediately smelled the odor of marijuana, and when he shined his
flashlight into the container, he saw a green leafy substance that he recognized as marijuana.
(See R., p.58.) After opening the container quickly, Ms. Neimeyer closed it and put it in her
purse. (R., p.58.) Officer Thompson then asked her to step out of the vehicle, and she exited
with her purse. (R., p.58.) The officers handcuffed Ms. Neimeyer, and Officer Thompson
explained she was being detained because of the alcohol found in the vehicle, the possibility she
was under the influence of something, and the marijuana in the container.

(R., p.58.)

Officer Thompson then searched the purse, finding suspected marijuana and methamphetamine,
a clear glass pipe with white and brown residue, and other suspected drug paraphernalia. (See
R., p.58.) He informed Ms. Neimeyer she was under arrest for possession of methamphetamine,
and Officer Comeau took her to the Twin Falls County Jail. (R., p.58.)
At the gas station, Officer Thompson conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, so it
could be towed. (R., p.58.) He found a white case containing a baggie with white and brown
particles inside. (See R., p.58.) Officer Thompson placed that baggie into an evidence bag,
finished the inventory, and turned over the vehicle to the towing company. (R., p.58.) Later, the

3

clear glass pipe and baggie from the white case tested presumptively positive for
methamphetamine, and the green leafy substance from the container tested presumptively
positive for marijuana. (See R., p.58.)
The State charged Ms. Neimeyer by Information with felony possession of a controlled
substance, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor possession of
drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.32-35.) She entered not guilty pleas. (R., p.43.)
Ms. Neimeyer filed a motion to suppress and supporting memorandum. (R., pp.37-42.)
She cited the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article
I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., p.38.) Ms. Neimeyer asserted she had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the container. (R., p.39.) She also asserted the officers’ search of the
container was unreasonable, because no probable cause existed for the search. (See R., pp.3940.) Ms. Neimeyer asserted: “In this case, officers did not have the necessary objective facts
that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the small canister would contain contraband.
Nothing suspicious and indicative of drugs was in plain view, or ‘plain smell.’ Ms. Neimeyer
had a rational explanation for her presence in the parking lot.” (R., p.40.) Further, she asserted,
“There was no reason to think alcohol would be kept in a small canister,” and “possessing an
open container of alcohol in a vehicle is not even a crime when the vehicle is not on a highway
or right of way.” (R., p.40.) She concluded: “In the absence of probable cause, the search was
unreasonable.

All evidence obtained subsequent to the unreasonable search should be

suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, or, in the alternative, this case should be dismissed.”
(R., pp.40-41.)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State stipulated to Ms. Neimeyer being able
to challenge the search. (See Tr., p.4, Ls.14-19.) The State also admitted into evidence the
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officers’ body camera footage from the incident. (State’s Ex. 1; see Tr., p.8, L.24 – p.9, L.7,
p.20, Ls.4-14.) When the State asked Officer Thompson, “What crimes did you suspect were
going on when you approached the vehicle,” he answered, “When I approached the vehicle, I
suspected I had at least an open container, which is a misdemeanor violation within the city code
of having an open container in the parking lot. . . . It’s 6-2-6 under intoxicants.” (Tr., p.11, L.25
– p.12, L.7.) But the State did not offer any evidence on Twin Falls City Code § 6-2-6. (See
Tr., p.11, L.25 – p.13, L.15.)
The State argued that the officers had first approached the vehicle under the community
caretaking function. (See Tr., p.23, Ls.6-17.) The State contended: “Upon investigating to
make sure that the driver of this vehicle was okay, Officer Comeau from the passenger side of
the vehicle observes a bottle, an open bottle of Fireball Whisky. As Officer Thompson testified,
that is a misdemeanor under Twin Falls City Code 6-2-6.” (Tr., p.23, L.25 – p.24, L.5.) The
State contended: “It differs a little bit from the state code in that they don’t have to be on a
highway. I think the state code requires a highway, and it’s also just a ticket, but as far as the
city code, it’s a misdemeanor.”

(Tr., p.24, Ls.6-10.)

The State then argued that, after

Ms. Neimeyer placed the bottle in the back of the vehicle, the officers “now have probable cause
that’s she’s committed a crime, if anything, a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant
had or was going to commit a crime.” (See Tr., p.24, Ls.11-18.) However, the State had not
offered any evidence on section 6-2-6. (See, e.g., Tr., p.22, Ls.21-22 (“The State has no further
evidence, Your Honor.”).) The State also argued, “it was just a consensual, voluntary opening of
that container that Officer Comeau asked for.” (Tr., p.25, Ls.12-14.)
Ms. Neimeyer agreed that the incident started as a community caretaking check, and
asserted, “Where it morphs into a seizure and a search is where she is required to open that black
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film canister.”

(Tr., p.26, Ls.2-14.)

Based on Officer Thompson’s body camera footage,

Ms. Neimeyer asserted she actually asked: “Do I have to? Do I have to open that container?”
(Tr., p.26, Ls.14-18.) According to Ms. Neimeyer, “Officer Thompson explains to her, ‘Well,
we’ve already seen that there’s these alcohol containers,’ when she asks if she has to open it and
says, ‘Well, I haven’t done anything wrong. Do I have to open it?’” (Tr., p.26, Ls.19-23.) She
asserted: “It’s an order, Your Honor. No one is going to think they don’t have to abide by what
the officer is telling them when the officer is saying, ‘Well, we already have this stuff so we have
to check that out too,’ something to that effect.’” (Tr., p.26, L.24 – p.27, L.3.)
Ms. Neimeyer asserted, “There’s no reason to think that alcohol would have been in a
container of that nature, and they hadn’t taken any steps to follow up on the containers that they
had seen to see if there was anything in them that would make her in violation of any statute.”
(Tr., p.27, Ls.12-16.) Moreover, Ms. Neimeyer had not been on a highway, and she had been
stationary in the parking lot because she had been on the phone. (See Tr., p.27, Ls.17-21.) She
asserted: “And it’s very clear from the video that Ms. Neimeyer asked if she had to open it,
meaning she doesn’t want to open it. But the response she gets from Officer Thompson indicates
to her that she has to open it, so she does.” (Tr., p.28, Ls.10-14.)
In a brief response, the State argued, “it’s just a consensual opening of the container,”
and, “there’s not one time the defendant’s says no.” (Tr., p.29, L.22 – p.30, L.2.) The State
contended: “If an officer asks somebody, ‘Will you do this?’ and they say, ‘Do I have to?’ that’s
not a refusal. That is not an unequivocal refusal to do something. Somebody can say do I have
to and still do it, which is what happened here.” (Tr., p.30, Ls.3-7.)
The district court subsequently issued a Memorandum Decision upon Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.56-64.) The court determined the interaction “began as a care
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taking interaction,” and “[o]nce Officer Comeau observed the bottle of alcohol in the passenger
area of the vehicle, the interaction became investigatory.” (R., p.60.) According to the district
court, “the interaction between the officers and the Defendant was nevertheless consensual, as
was the search of the small black container.” (R., p.60.)
The district court determined the interaction was consensual under the totality of
the circumstances. (See R., pp.60-61.) The court determined that, when Ms. Neimeyer “was
asked by Officer Comeau to show the contents of the small black container to Officer
Thompson,” she “protested initially to opening the container, but did open the container after
Officer Thompson implied that the alcohol in the vehicle provided probable cause to arrest and
search the Defendant and the vehicle.” (R., p.61.) The district court cited State v. Ballou, 145
Idaho 840, 848 (Ct. App. 2008), where the Idaho Court of Appeals “found that an officer’s
statement that he would obtain a search warrant did not render consent to search a home invalid.”
(R., p.61.) The district court determined, “The same reasoning applies in this case.” (R., p.61.)
The district court noted that Ms. Neimeyer “was found with an open container of alcohol
in the passenger section of her vehicle.” (R., p.61.) The court then quoted from what it stated
was Twin Falls City Code § 6-2-6, despite the State never offering any evidence on the city
ordinance. (See R., p.61.) The district court determined: “The officers could have arrested the
Defendant for having a bottle of alcohol the seal of which had been broken and which was found
in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, in violation of Twin Falls City Code Section 6-2-6.
At that point, the officers could have conducted a search incident to that arrest.” (R., p.62.) Per
the district court, “As part of that search incident to arrest, the officers could have performed a
search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle.” (R., p.62.) Thus, the court determined,
“Officer Thompson’s comment implying he and Officer Comeau had probable cause to arrest the
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Defendant and conduct a search was accurate and did not render the consent of the Defendant in
opening the container invalid.” (R., p.62.)
The district court also determined that the officers “could have performed an inventory
search of the vehicle after arresting the Defendant for the misdemeanor violation. In fact,
Officer Thompson did conduct an inventory search of the Defendant’s vehicle after the
Defendant was placed in custody.” (R., p.62.)
In its conclusion, the district court determined, “based on the evidence presented, that the
Defendant consented to opening the small black container which contained marijuana.”
(R., p.62.) The court determined “Officer Thompson’s perception of the smell and sight of the
marijuana then gave the officers probable cause to detain and search the Defendant, and place
her under arrest for possession of a controlled substance,” and the officer “was then justified in
performing an inventory search of the vehicle, which turned up additional evidence of illegal
activity.” (R., p.62.) The district court then determined, “However, even if the initial search, the
Defendant opening the small black container, was not based on voluntary consent, the search
would still be valid under the inevitable discovery doctrine.” (R., p.62.) The court denied
Ms. Neimeyer’s motion to suppress. (R., p.63.)
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement reserving her right to appeal the denial of the
motion to suppress, Ms. Neimeyer pleaded guilty to all of the charges. (See R., pp.66-77.) For
felony possession of a controlled substance, the district court imposed a unified sentence of six
years, with three years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Ms. Neimeyer on probation for
a period of four years. (R., pp.93-97.)
Ms. Neimeyer filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction, Order of Probation. (R., pp.106-10.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Neimeyer's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neimeyer's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Ms. Neimeyer asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress. The

district court's legal determination that Ms. Neimeyer violated Twin Falls City Code§ 6-2-6 was
in error, because the district court's factual fmdings on the content of section 6-2-6 were clearly
erroneous due to the State's failure to prove the city ordinance's existence. The district court's
factual fmding that Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to the search of the small black
container was clearly erroneous, because the officers implied they had probable cause to arrest
and search her, even though section 6-2-6 provided no legal basis to do so, which helped render
her consent involuntary. Further, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not save the evidence
from exclusion, because the record does not show the officers would have inevitably performed a
valid arrest on Ms. Neimeyer. Thus, the district court should have granted Ms. Neimeyer's
motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Moore, 164

Idaho 379, 381 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court has held,
"When we review an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's
factual fmdings, unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

"Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are

supported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).
"Substantial, competent evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
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adequate to support a conclusion." Moore, 164 Idaho at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and
factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court." Bishop, 146
Idaho at 810. The appellate court "freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to
the facts as found." Moore, 164 Idaho at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neimeyer's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated. 1 U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches and seizures
are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). To
overcome this presumption, the search must fall within a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. Id. at 455. When a defendant challenges a warrantless search, the State
bears the burden to show that a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is
applicable. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970).
Consent is one

such well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). As the United States Supreme Court has

held, the State has the burden of showing that the consent "was in fact, freely and voluntarily
given." Id. at 222 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The question of whether a consent to a
search was in fact 'voluntary' ... is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances." Id. at 227.

1

Ms. Neimeyer also asserted the search of the container was unlawful under Article I, § 17 of the
Idaho Constitution. (See R., p.38.) However, she did not specifically articulate before the
district court why the Idaho Constitution would be more protective than the Fourth Amendment
in this context.
11

1.

The Legal Determination That Ms. Neimeyer Violated Section 6-2-6 Was In Error

The district court's legal determination that Ms. Neimeyer violated Twin Falls City Code
§ 6-2-6 was in error, because the district court's factual findings on the content of the city
ordinance were clearly erroneous. The State never proved the existence of section 6-2-6.
The existence of a city ordinance is a factual question that must be proven to the trier of
fact. See Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867 (1988); People v. Buchanan, 1 Idaho 681 (1878).
Idaho Code § 9-101 provides that courts may take judicial notice of, among various items,
"Public and private official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of this state
and of the United States." LC. § 9-101(3). The Idaho Supreme Court in Marcher, interpreting
section 9-101, held: "Inasmuch as this statute only permits a court to take judicial notice of
legislative acts, it follows that the court may not take judicial notice of city ordinances or of the
various codes adopted under them. Such matters must be proved." Marcher, 113 Idaho at 870.
The Marcher Court quoted from Buchanan, where the Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho
held, "Courts will, judicially, take notice of the public and private acts of legislatures, and
assume them to be true; such, however, is not the rule in regard to city ordinances; they must be
proved either by the record, or by a certified copy thereof" Buchanan, l Idaho at 684.
Here, the State never proved the existence of section 6-2-6. While Officer Thompson
mentioned section 6-2-6 in his testimony, the State did not offer a certified copy of the city
ordinance or otherwise present evidence of its legal adoption or its content. (See, e.g., Tr., p.11,
L.25 - p.12, L.7.) Further, the district court could not have validly taken judicial notice of
section 6-2-6 as a city ordinance. See Marcher, 113 Idaho at 870; Buchanan, l Idaho at 684.
Thus, the State never proved the existence of section 6-2-6.
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Because the State never proved the existence of section 6-2-6, the district court's factual
findings on the content of the city ordinance were clearly erroneous. The district court ostensibly
quoted from section 6-2-6 in its memorandum decision. (See R., p.61.) However, the district
court's factual findings on the content of section 6-2-6 were not supported by substantial,
competent evidence, because the State never proved the existence of the city ordinance. See
Moore, 164 Idaho at 381; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. Thus, the district court's factual findings on

the content of section 6-2-6 were clearly erroneous. See Munoz, 149 Idaho at 128.
Because the district court's factual findings on the content of section 6-2-6 were clearly
erroneous, the district court's legal determination that Ms. Neimeyer violated the city ordinance
was in error. See Moore, 164 Idaho at 381. Put otherwise, because the State never proved the
existence of section 6-2-6, the district court could not properly determine that Ms. Neimeyer
violated the city ordinance.
2.

The Factual Finding That Ms. Neimeyer Voluntary Consented To The Search Of
The Container Was Clearly Erroneous, Because The Officers' Baseless
Implication They Could Search Her Helped Render Her Consent Involuntary

The district court's factual fmding that Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to the search
of the container was clearly erroneous, because the officers implied they had probable cause to
arrest and search her without actually having probable cause on this record to do so, which
helped render her consent involuntary.
The State has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily
given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222. Whether a consent to search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.

Id. at 227.

"In

examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the consent to search was
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coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.” Id. at 229.
Under the totality of the circumstances here, the district court’s factual finding that
Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to the search of the container was clearly erroneous. The
district court analogized its reasoning to that in State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 848 (Ct. App.
2008), where the Idaho Court of Appeals “found that an officer’s statement that he would obtain
a search warrant did not render consent to search a home invalid.” (See R., p.61.) The district
court here determined, “Officer Thompson’s comment implying that he and Officer Comeau had
probable cause to . . . arrest the Defendant and conduct a search was accurate and did not render
the consent of the Defendant in opening the container invalid.” (R., p.62.) However, the district
court’s analogy falls apart because, as shown above, the district court’s legal determination that
Ms. Neimeyer violated Twin Falls City Code § 6-2-6 was in error. On this record, the officers
did not have probable cause to arrest and search Ms. Neimeyer for a violation of section 6-2-6.
That the officers implied they had probable cause to arrest and search Ms. Neimeyer,
without actually having probable cause on this record to do so, helped render her consent to the
search involuntary. The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “a false or erroneous representation by
police regarding the right to obtain a warrant weighs against a finding of voluntariness.” State v.
Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 489 (2007) (citing State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 863 (Ct. App. 2001); State
v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708-09 (Ct. App. 1998)). The Smith Court also held, “Baseless threats
to obtain a search warrant may render consent involuntary.” Id. (quoting United States v. White,
979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The officers’ implication that they could arrest and search Ms. Neimeyer for violating
section 6-2-6 was similarly baseless on this record. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held, “an
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officer’s implied or explicit offer not to arrest a suspect if he ‘turns over what he has’ is not
coercive if it merely informs the suspect of the officer’s intention to do something that is within
the officer’s authority based on the circumstances.” State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 779-80
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Medenbach, 616 P.2d 543, 545 (Or. App. 1980)). However, the
Garcia Court held the officers in that case had probable cause to actually effectuate an arrest.
See id. at 780.
Conversely, here the officers did not have probable cause to effectuate an arrest on this
record, because the State never proved the existence of section 6-2-6, and the district court could
not, therefore, properly determine that Ms. Neimeyer violated the city ordinance.

Thus,

Officer’s Thompson’s comment, implying the officers had probable cause to arrest and search
Ms. Neimeyer when that was not within the officers’ authority, was coercive under these
circumstances. See Garcia, 143 Idaho at 780; see also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
551 (1968) (“When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant,
he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct
with coercion—albeit colorably lawful coercion.

Where there is coercion there cannot be

consent.”). The officers’ baseless implication that they could legally search Ms. Neimeyer
helped render her consent to search involuntary.
Overall, the totality of the circumstances indicates that Ms. Neimeyer’s consent to the
search of the container was involuntary. The district court determined that, before the search, the
officers did not park closely behind Ms. Neimeyer’s vehicle, did not activate their emergency
lights, did not draw their weapons, did not apply any physical force, did not ask her to leave the
vehicle, and did not retain her identification. (See R., p.61.) However, as the district court also
noted, “the encounter did take place late at night, and the officers were armed and in uniform.”
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(See R., p.61.) Further, "The officers did not inform the Defendant that she was free to leave, but

such information is not required." (R., p.61.) Moreover, the district court did not find the
officers told Ms. Neimeyer that she was free to refuse to consent. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
248-49.

Thus, in view of Officer Thompson's baseless comment implying the officers had

probable cause to arrest and search Ms. Neimeyer, as well as all the other circumstances, the
totality of the circumstances in the instant case indicates that Ms. Neimeyer's consent to the
search of the container was involuntary. See id. at 227.
Under the totality of the circumstances here, the district court's factual finding that
Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to the search of the container was clearly erroneous. See
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. The district court only determined that consent justified the search.
(See R., p.62.) In the absence of valid consent or another applicable well-recognized exception

to the warrant requirement, the State did not meet its burden of showing that the warrantless
search of Ms. Neimeyer was reasonable.

See Vale, 399 U.S. at 34.

Thus, the search was

unlawful, and the district court should have granted Ms. Neimeyer' s motion to suppress.
3.

The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Does Not Save The Evidence From Exclusion,
Because The Record Does Not Show The Officers Would Have Inevitably
Performed A Valid Arrest On Ms. Neimeyer

The inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to the evidence derived from the
unlawful search of Ms. Neimeyer, because the record does not show the officers would have
inevitably performed a valid arrest and search on Ms. Neimeyer. The district court determined
that "even if the initial search, the Defendant opening the small black container, was not based
on voluntary consent, the search would still be valid under the inevitable discovery doctrine."
(R., p.62.) But the inevitable discovery doctrine does not save the evidence from exclusion.
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Evidence obtained in violation of United States and Idaho constitutional protections
against unreasonable searches generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the
illegal government action. See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 515-19 (2012); Bishop, 146 Idaho
at 810-11.

This exclusionary rule “applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal

government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality,
or the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, there are various
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the inevitable discovery doctrine. See State v.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017).
Although the district court did not discuss the standards for the inevitable discovery
doctrine (see R., p.62), the Idaho Supreme Court has held, “the inevitable discovery doctrine
asks courts to engage in a hypothetical finding into the lawful actions law enforcement would
have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful avenue that led to the evidence.” State v.
Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31 (2017) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 497 (2001)) (emphasis in original). “The premise
is that law enforcement should be in ‘the same, not a worse, position that they would have been’
absent the misconduct.” Id. (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (majority opinion)). “The doctrine
must presuppose inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions, not in series
flowing directly from the officers’ unlawful conduct.” Id. at 32. “The inevitable discovery
doctrine is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by substituting what the police
should have done for what they really did.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
The State must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, those hypothetical inevitable
lawful actions. See id. at 31.
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The district court did not expressly frame its inevitable discovery doctrine determinations
within the bounds established by Nix, Downing and Stuart. (See R., p.62.) It appears the district
court suggested that, even if the consent to search were involuntary, the inevitable discovery
doctrine would apply because the officers could have arrested and searched Ms. Neimeyer for
violating Twin Falls City Code § 6-2-6, and they could have subsequently performed an
inventory search of the vehicle. (See R., p.62.) However, an arrest and search for violating
section 6-2-6, and a following inventory search, would not be “lawful actions law enforcement
would have inevitably taken” for purposes of inevitable discovery. See Downing, 163 Idaho at
31 (emphasis omitted). As established above, because the State never proved the existence of
section 6-2-6, the district court could not properly determine that Ms. Neimeyer violated the city
ordinance. Thus, on this record, it cannot be said that the arrest and search for violating section
6-2-6 would have been a lawful action.
Moreover, inventory searches are permissible if they are “police intrusions into
automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at
securing or protecting the car and its contents,” and if they are conducted pursuant to standard
police procedures. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976); State v. Smith,
120 Idaho 77, 80 (1991). On this record, because the arrest and search of Ms. Neimeyer for
violating section 6-2-6 would not have been lawful, the subsequent inventory search of her
vehicle would also be unlawful because the vehicle would not have been in lawful police
custody.

Thus, the inventory search would also not be a lawful action for purposes of

inevitable discovery.
Additionally, the district court’s inevitable discovery determinations did not establish that
the arrest and search for violating section 6-2-6, and the following inventory search of
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Ms. Neimeyer’s vehicle, would have been inevitable. While the district court determined the
officers could have arrested Ms. Neimeyer for violating section 6-2-6, the district court did not
find that the officers were going to arrest her, in any event, for that violation. (See R., pp.56-58,
62.) Also, it does not appear that Officers Thompson and Comeau testified that they were going
to arrest Ms. Neimeyer for the section 6-2-6 violation, no matter what. (See Tr., p.5, L.6 – p.22,
L.20.)

Similarly, the State did not offer any evidence on the police standard operating

procedures for inventory searches, much less on whether those procedures would have inevitably
prompted Officer Thompson to inventory search the vehicle and have it towed.

(See

generally Tr.)
In sum, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not save the evidence from exclusion,
because the record does not show the officers would have inevitably performed a valid arrest and
search on Ms. Neimeyer. See Downing, 163 Idaho at 31-32. Thus, the evidence derived from
the unlawful search of Ms. Neimeyer may not be used against her. See Koivu, 152 Idaho at 51519; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810-11.
The district court’s legal determination that Ms. Neimeyer violated Twin Falls City Code
§ 6-2-6 was in error.

The district court’s factual finding that Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily

consented to the search of the container was clearly erroneous. The inevitable discovery doctrine
does not save the evidence from exclusion. Thus, the warrantless search of Ms. Neimeyer was
unlawful, and the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress. Ms. Neimeyer’s
judgment of conviction and order of probation should be vacated, and the district court’s order
denying her motion to suppress should be reserved.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Neimeyer respectfully requests that this Court vacate her
judgment of conviction and order of probation, and reverse the district court's order denying her
motion to suppress.
DATED this 16th day of September, 2019.
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